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Abstract
In this paper we consider an exchange economy where there is an external
restriction for the consumption of goods. This restriction is dened by both a
cap on consumption of certain commodities and the requirement of an amount
of rights for the consumption of these commodities. The caps for consumption
are imposed exogenously due to the negative eects that the consumption may
produce. The consumption rights are distributed among the agents. This fact
leads to the possibility of establishing licence or consumption rights markets.
These consumption rights do not participate in agents' preferences, however the
individual's budgetary constraint may be modied, leading to a reassignment of
resources.
The aim of this paper is to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium
price system linking tradable rights prices with commodity prices.
Keywords: competitive equilibrium, quotas, consumption rights, cap-and-trade pro-
gram.
JEL Classication: D51, D62, Q52.
1 Introduction
Tradable-licence systems are the focus of current interest in market-based natural re-
sources or environmental policies. For example, a system of licences is interesting as
it could provide a mean to achieve ecient solutions to set restrictions on shing for
certain sh species or in order to organize a market of emission licences or pollution
rights in a decentralized manner.
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1An emission licence system confers the agents holding it the right to consume. In the
examples above, the right to capture a protected species of sh or to emit pollutants at
a certain rate. However, it is not always desirable to allow such rights to be transferred
on a one-to-one basis. In a market system these licences should be tradable and the
desirable rule governing exchange of rights should be based on a market-price system.
These types of models have been analyzed by several authors since mid last century
(see Baumol et al. [1] and Montero [7] as general references). Focusing on pricing rights
in a competitive basis, a precise formulation of emission licences model appears in the
seminal paper by Montgomery [8]. In a scenario where an exchange of such licences
between polluters at dierent locations is considered, Montgomery shows that market
equilibrium in emission licences exists and that with some restrictions on the initial
allocation of licences, the market equilibrium with emission licences is ecient. On
the other hand, Boyd and Conley [3] were the rst to treat directly the eciency
problem in presence of externalities opposed to an indirectly way through Arrovian
commodities, arguing that the essential non-convexities highlighted by Starrett [9] are
due to unboundedness of the negative eects rather than the externalities itself.
Later, Conley and Smith [4] extended the Boyd and Conley model to allow rms
to benet from public goods and be damaged by externalities, proving the existence of
a competitive equilibrium and stating a rst welfare theorem. Their main result could
be viewed as a type of general equilibrium Coase theorem. More recently, the paper by
A. Mandel [6], focuses on the inuence on the general equilibrium of an economy of the
opening of markets of allowances. Assuming there existed an equilibrium before the
opening of allowances markets, this paper describes the changes in the rms behavior
which guarantee that an equilibrium can be reached in the enlarged economy.
The presence of an Arrovian market with consumable (and tradable) licences or
the models considered by Boyd and Conley, Conley and Smith, or Mandel imply to
re-consider the pollutants as crucial consumptions goods as well as key input factors for
production, which drive us to the necessity of re-dening the individual preferences and
production sets in order to take into account these new factors in their formulations.
How to model changes in preferences (and production sets) since to the presence of
new goods in the market is certainly an open question, for which we do not know a
satisfactory answer at this moment.
In this paper, we consider a scenario in which limits to the consumption of certain
commodities have been established exogenously and that the consumption of these
commodities requires the availability of certain amount of rights or licences for its
consumption. The scenario may reect a situation where, due to binding international
agreements, limits to the consumption of certain raw materials or limits to the capture
of protected species have been established in order to restrict the potential negative
eects produced by their consumption. These negative eects can be, for example, the
extinction of a species or dierent types of environmental pollution.
Our aim is to set a simple model in order to analyze the immediate consequences
of setting a limit on the consumption of certain commodities and, at the same time,
a market of licences required for the consumption. For it, we consider an exchange
economy with externalities (the individual's preferences depend on private consumption
2goods chosen by this individual and on the entire consumption plan chosen by other
agents in the economy). Consumption rights do not participate in preferences but may
modify the budgetary constraints.
The restrictions of the model primarily aect the agents' consumption sets. Agents
may not consume certain quantities of specic commodities even when these form part
of their endowments. Secondly, it may aect the agents' budget sets, since in order
to consume they will need to have the required rights. If an agent does not have
those rights, she may buy them investing part of her income coming from consumption
goods, or on the contrary, if she has any licences left over, she could sell them to get
an additional income.
It is also assumed that the estimated negative eects, and consequently the rights
required for the consumption of specic commodities, could depend not only on the
quantity of those commodities but also on the entire consumption plan selected by the
consumer. Our objective here is to reect the situation in which a consumption plan,
which entails a high technology, may involve less adverse eects, and consequently to
require fewer consumption rights than another less technological consumption plan.
This model assumes that each agent is endowed with a certain amount of each type
of consumption rights which are necessary for consumption and that can be traded.
The agent's choice of a specic consumption plan requires that she has the inherent
licences for that consumption.
Our approach diers from other previous works in several aspects. Firstly, we do not
consider explicitly production. In our model, agents evaluate their utility considering
all the consequences involved in their consumption plan. Thus, our model is a pure
exchange market in which the consumption rights are traded at the same time as the
commodities, that is, consumption rights must be required at the same time as the
buying contracts for raw materials are signed, no matter what the raw materials are
used for. Therefore, more importantly, we do not require to measure the actual negative
eects of consumption. Instead, we only suppose the existence of an external function
which evaluates the potential negative eects derived from each contract, by mapping
every consumption plan (contract) into a theoretical amount of rights of each type.
Secondly, we do not need to introduce any other type of good in individual' preferences
and neither in the production sector (Arrovian markets), which avoid us to justify how
preferences and/or production sets could be distorted by introducing them.
Due to the presence of externalities in consumption (as we setup the model in
Section 2), we introduce the concept of Nash - Walras equilibria as a competitive
outcome in our framework. This concept coincides with the standard Walras notion if
we do not consider externalities.
In Section 3 we prove a Walras' Law for our equilibrium concept. The main result
of this paper is Theorem 1 in Section 4, which establish the existence of a Nash-Walras
equilibrium under general conditions on the fundamentals of the economy. Additionally,
in Section 5 we present an eciency property of our equilibrium, Theorem 2. Eciency
is dened here as Nash - Pareto optimality, which, without externalities coincides
with the standard concept of strong Paretianity. Finally, Section 6 is devoted to the
conclusion remarks and further developments.
32 The model
Following the standard Arrow-Debreu model, let us consider an economy with m 2
I N consumers and ` 2 I N dierent consumption goods; each consumer i 2 I =
f1;2;:::;mg is endowed with consumption goods denoted by !i 2 I R
`
+ and the corre-
sponding consumption set is Xi  I R
`
+. Following, we set ! =
P
i2I !i, X =
Q
i2I Xi





In order to incorporate externalities in consumption, preferences of an individual
i 2 I will be represented by a utility function
ui : X i  Xi ! I R:
We assume that limits to the consumption of certain commodities have been es-
tablished exogenously due to binding international agreements established, where con-
sumption of these commodities requires the availability of certain rights or licences.
After an exogenous Cap-setting Process, limits to consumption are given by the ma-
pping
f : I R
`
+ ! I R
k
+;
which denes the amount of the each type of k 2 I N negative eects that could produce
the consumption of the allocation x 2 I R
`
+.
For j 2 K = f1;:::;kg, the Cap-setting Process sets a limit Rj 2 I R++ on the total
allocation of the economy; we set
R = (Rj) 2 I R
k
++:
In our model, the cap-setting process yet mentioned implies that for each j 2 K,




where fj denotes the j 2 K component of f that denes the caps to consumption
that have been exogenously establish. Observe that fj(xi) could be the amount of
commodity j representing certain raw material for which a cap has been established
in order to restrict the potential negative eects that this consumption will produce.
However, we are considering a more general setting; in this model, each one of the
potential negative eects and, consequently each cap, is measured globally in the sense
that it depends not only on the amount of a given commodity but on the global
consumption plan of the individuals. Proceeding in this way, we have in mind, for
example, that a more technological consumption plan may produce less negative eects
than a technologically poorer alternative.
4On the other hand, we assume that for each j 2 K there is a type of consumption
right and that each individual i 2 I is endowed with an amount of each of them.
Formally, each agent i 2 I is endowed with a vector
ri = (r
j
i) 2 I R
k
+




i = Rj; j 2 K:
If agent i 2 I decides to consume x 2 Xi then she must have an amount f(x) 2 I R
k
+
of each consumption rights. One key assumption in our model is that the consumption
rights can be traded in the market and that they do not participate in the individual's
preferences. The fact that consumption rights can be traded in the market implies
that any individual may exchange them with consequences on the size of her bud-
getary set; as for consumption goods, prices for consumption rights will be determined
endogenously as part of the equilibrium.
Thus, the dierence
ri   f(x) 2 I R
k
denes either the amount of consumption rights that individual i 2 I may sell in the
market (those for which the corresponding component is positive) or those she needs to
buy since his initial endowment of the corresponding consumption right is not enough
to support the consumption of x (negative components).
If the price for consumption rights is s 2 I R
k
+, then the consumption of x as before
implies that the total wealth he can obtain (or pay if negative) from this side is
s  [ri   f(x)] 2 I R:
In the following,  will be the Simplex in I R
`+k and for n 2 I N+ and x; y 2 I R
n,
we say that x n y i xi  yi, for each i = 1;2;:::;n, x <n y i x n y and x 6= y
and, x <<n y i xi < yi, for each i = 1;2;:::;n. Finally, 0n is the zero in I R
n.
Denition 1 For (p;s) 2 , the budgetary set for individual i 2 I at prices (p;s) is
dened by
Bi(p;s) = fi 2 Xi j p  i  p  !i + s  [ri   f(i)]g:
Denition 2 An economy with consumption rights and externalities is dened as
ER = (Xi;(ui);(!i);(ri);f)i2I:
The corresponding economy without consumption rights (\exchange economy with
externalities") will be denoted by
E = (Xi;(ui);(!i))i2I:
5In order to dene the equilibrium notion for economy ER, we should consider feasi-
bility in both consumption goods and consumption rights.
Denition 3 We say that x = (xi) 2 X is a feasible allocation for economy ER if
X
i2I





f(xi) k R 2 I R
k
+:
The set of feasible allocation for economy ER is denoted by FR.
Remark 1 Observe that the endowments (!i) 2 X need not to be a feasible allocation




More in general, for j 2 K suppose that fj is a convex function and fj(0`) = 0; if
x = (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 X allocates the total endowments, that is,
P
i2I











Consequently, if Rj < mfj(!=m) the cap is eective. That is, it is not possible to
allocate the total endowments of the economy.
Finally, the denition below is a natural extension of the competitive equilibrium
notion we have for an exchange economy1.
Denition 4 We say that ((p;s);(x
i)) 2 I R
m`
+ is a Nash-Walras equilibrium for
economy ER if
(a) x = (x
i) 2 FR
(b) for each i 2 I, x
i 2 Bi(p;s); and x
i maximizes ui(x
 i;) on Bi(p;s).
3 Walras' Law and some direct consequences
We begin this Section with the following straightforward lemmata, which will be useful
to show the Walras' Law in our context (Proposition 1) and a version of the First
Welfare Theorem we present in Section 5.
1In the following, for x = (xi) 2 X, we adopt the notation ui(x) = ui(x i;xi).
6Lemma 1 Suppose that f : I R
`
+ ! I R
k
+ is continuos and that for i 2 I and for any
x i 2 X i, ui(x i;) : Xi ! I R is locally non-satiated2. Given ((p;s);(x
i)) a Nash-
Walras equilibrium of ER, if for xi 2 Xi holds that ui(x)  ui(x
 i;xi), then
p
  xi  p
  !i + s
  [ri   f(xi)]:
Proof. Suppose that p  xi < p  !i + s  [ri   f(xi)]: Since f is continuous, there





  !i + s




i 2 B(xi;). Therefore, by local non satiation, there are a point z 2 B(xi;)
such that ui(x
 i;xi) < ui(x
 i;z) and then ui(x) < ui(x
 i;z), which contradicts that
(x
i) is the equilibrium allocation at prices (p;s). E.O.P
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Walras' Law
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, if ((p;s);(x





















Proof. From Lemma 1, for each i 2 I, p  x





























i) k R and (p;s) 2 I R
`+k















 0, which along with (1) implies the desired result. E.O.P
Remark 2 For a Nash - Walras equilibrium ((p;s);(x
i)), the fact that consumption




ik !ik < 0; under this situation, the Walras' Law implies that p
k = 0.
Note that this fact does not depend on the distribution of consumption rights among
individuals but only depends on the aggregate value of the consumption rights. In this
situation, as we will see in the next example, the individual's assignment of consumption
rights could have consequences on their welfare in the equilibrium, allowing further
analysis regarding public policy through the assignment of consumption rights among
agents. This will not be treated in this work.
2That is, for any x i 2 X i,  > 0 and xi 2 Xi, there exists x0
i 2 B(xi;) \ Xi such that
ui(x i;xi) < ui(x i;x0
i), where B(xi;) is the open ball with center xi and radius .
7Suppose that consumption rights eectively restrict the consumption of a good
k 2 f1;2;:::;`g and that for some consumer i the good k is desirable, that is, for any
positive ; u(x
i +ek) > u(x
i), where ek is the k-th vector of the canonic basis of I R
`.
From this, follows immediately that p
k = 0 and, from the the budgetary constrain,
we have that for some j 2 K, s
j > 0 and fj(x
i + ek) > fj(x
i): In consequence, an
eective cap on a commodity implies that the equilibrium price of that commodity is
zero and that the price of the consumption right becomes the relevant price.
On the contrary, note that when the level of consumption rights is large enough,
the price of the consumption rights becomes zero at the equilibrium and the economy
is equivalent to a classical exchange market with externalities E.
Example 1 In order to dene economy ER, suppose m = 2, ` = 2 and




with 0 <  < 1. Endowments of goods are (!i2;!i2) 2 I R
2
+; i = 1;2;
set !j = !1j + !2j > 0; j = 1;2. Suppose additionally that K = 1,
f(x1;x2) = bx2 (with b > 0) and endowment for consumption rights are
ri  0; i = 1;2. Set R = r1 + r2 > 0. The economy E is dened by ui and
(!i1;!i2); i = 1;2; as before. In the following, assume that good one is the
numerary and prices for good two and consumption rights are denoted by
p and s respectively. From the monotonicity of the involving functions, the







i2 s:t: xi1 + pxi2 = !i1 + p!i2 + s[ri   bxi2]; xi1; xi2  0;
whose unique solution is
xi1(p;s) = [!i1 + p!i2 + sri]; xi2(p;s) = (1 )
"
!i1 + p!i2 + sri
p + bs
#
; i = 1;2:
The equilibriums conditions for goods one and two are, respectively,
x11(p;s) + x21(p;s) = !1 , [!1 + p!2 + sR] = !1 (2)
x12(p;s) + x22(p;s)  !2 , (1   )
"




Combining (2), (3) and the budget constrain, for any s  0
s[R   b!2]  0: (4)
For the case R > b!2, the unique equilibrium price is
8s







which coincides with the equilibrium price for the economy E. For the
case R = b!2, there are innitely many equilibrium prices (p;s) 2 I R
2
+,
parametrized by the relation p + sb = pc.
For the case R < b!2, from (4) we have that s  0. However, note that s = 0
is not an admissible solution, since in such case the aggregated equilibrium
demand for consumption goods two would be equal to those obtained for
economy E (i.e !2), which, by condition, is not a feasible allocation from
the consumption rights side. In consequence, we may assume s > 0 and








If we denote by R0 the consumption eectively employed by agents, follows
that
b(1   )!1 + p[b(1   )!2   R
0] + s[b(1   )R   bR
0] = 0; (5)







+ s[R   R
0] = 0:
Since R0  R < b!2, in order to obtain positive equilibrium prices we must
impose R0 = R, which lead us to conclude that the equilibrium price for

















= !i1 + (1   )!1
ri
R
; i = 1;2; (6)
which, for individual i = 1;2, would be greater than those obtained in the







Regarding good two, given  = R b!2 > 0, the aggregated demand at the









Note that R < b!2 implies that for some i = 1;2, ri < b!i2. Thus, the
initial endowments of goods and rights do not necessarily belong to the
budgetary set for this individual, at any price. This fact is relevant in our
model since it implies that we cannot use standard arguments to prove the
existence of equilibrium in our setting by considering an extended economy
where consumption rights appear as new commodities in the market, even
though they do not directly participate in agent's preferences.
Finally, from (6), the presence of consumption rights in the market im-
ply a redistribution of good one between agents that otherwise can not be
reached as a competitive outcome in economy E, unless a redistribution of
endowments is carried out. However, from (7) we also have that the pres-
ence of them may eectively restrict the consumption of goods, implying
an excess of supply that cannot be assigned to any individual. Thus, the
consumption rights cannot necessarily be interpreted as a tax mechanism
whose role is to reach a certain point in the contract curve of economy E.
4 Existence of equilibrium
For the existence of equilibrium in our model we will consider quite standard hypotheses
on the fundamentals of the economy. The strongest condition we are assuming for the
existence of equilibrium result is SS (strong survival condition).
Assumption C. For each i 2 I, Xi  I R
`
+ is convex, closed and 0`; !i 2 Xi.
Assumption SS. For each i 2 I, !i 2 I R
`
++ and ri 2 I R
k
++:
Assumption R. For each j 2 K, fj : I R
`
+ ! I R+ is convex, continuous
and fj(0`) = 0 (i.e., f(0`) = 0k).
Assumption U. For each i 2 I, ui : X ! I R is continuous and for each
x i 2 X i, ui(x i;) : Xi ! I R is locally non-satiated and quasi-concave.
In order to facilitate the demonstration of our main result, we introduce the auxi-
liary economy EM
R , which diers from ER only in the consumption sets that now, for
individual i 2 I; is dened by3
3The closure of A  I R




i = Xi \ clB (0`;Mk!k);
with M > 1 a given constant4. We set XM =
Q
i2I XM









Lemma 2 Under Assumptions C, SS and R, for i 2 I the correspondence
B
M








i j p  i  p  !i + s  [ri   f(i)]
o
is continuous.
Proof. From Assumption C, it follows directly that for each i 2 I, BM
i is a closed
correspondence. Since XM
i is compact it is upper semi-continuous.
Now, in order to show the lower semi-continuity of BM
i at any point (p0;s0) 2 ,
let G be any open set such that BM
i (p0;s0)
T
G 6= ; and let  belonging to this set.
Observe that by Assumption S we have that
0 < p0  !i + s0  [ri   f(0`)];
and therefore, from the convexity of f we conclude that for all  2 [0;1)
p0   < p0  !i + s0  [ri   f()]:
Let be 0 < 1 such that 0 2 G: Since f is continuous, there exists  > 0 such that
k (p;s)   (p0;s0) k<  implies that
p  0 < p  !i + s  [ri   f(0)];
from which we deduce that BM
i (p;s)
T
G 6= ; for all (p;s) 2  such that k (p;s)  
(p0;s0) k< . This last assertion nally lead us to conclude that BM
i is a continuous
correspondence as required. E.O.P
Theorem 1 Existence of Equilibrium
Under assumptions C, SS, R and U there exist a Nash-Walras equilibrium for
economy ER.
Proof. For i 2 I dene the function
u

i :   X
M  X
M











i ((p;s);x) = B
M
i (p;s):
4Note that from feasibility condition for consumption bundles, any relevant consumption plan xi
for an individual i 2 I should comply with 0`  xi ` ! and therefore kxik  k!k.
11Note that under assumption U, the demand correspondence of the auxiliary economy
EM
R , DM
i , dened by
D
M






i ((p;s);x) = fi 2 B
M
i ((p;s);x) j ui(x i;i)  ui(x i;z); 8z 2 B
M
i ((p;s);x)g;
is compact and convex valued and from Lemma 2 and the Maximum Theorem (Berge
[2]), it is upper semi-continuous.




0 :   X




















and the constant correspondence
B
M
0 :   X





The demand of the market is dened by the correspondence,
D
M
0 :   X






0) 2  j (p













 0;8(~ p; ~ s) 2 
)
;
which is convex and compact valued and, again by the Maximum Theorem (Berge,
[2]), it is upper semi-continuous.
Thus, if we dene
D
M :   X








follows immediately that DM is compact and convex valued and upper semi continuous
and since   XM is convex and compact, from Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem we
conclude that there exist ((p;s);(x
















(ii) (p;s) 2 DM
0 ((p;s);(x
i)).
12From condition (i), x
i maximizes ui(x
 i;) on the budget set BM
i ((p;s);x): On
the other hand, since x
i 2 BM





  !i + s
  [ri   f(x

i)];













































i   ! ` 0`:
In the same way, taking p = 0` and letting s be each vector of the canonic basis of
I R





i)   R k 0k:
Thus, all the foregoing implies that ((p;s);(x
i)) 2   XM is an equilibrium for
economy EM
r . In order to show that ((p;s);(x
i)) is also an equilibrium for economy
ER, let us suppose that for some i 2 I there exists ~ xi 2 Xi n XM
i such that
(a) ui(x
 i; ~ xi) > ui(x
 i;x
i),
(b) p  ~ xi  p  !i + s  [ri   f(~ xi)]:
Taking ~  2]0;1[ close enough to one, Assumption C implies that ~ ~ xi 2 Xi and
from Assumption U, ui(x
 i; ~ ~ xi) > ui(x
 i;x
i). Moreover, condition (b) above directly
implies
p
  (~ ~ xi) < p
  !i + s
  [ri   f(~ xi)]: (9)
Additionally, from Assumption R is easy to check that  f(~ xi) k  f(~ ~ xi); and
then, considering that s 2 I R
k
+, inequality (9) nally implies
p
  (~ ~ xi) < p
  !i + s
 
h
ri   f(~ ~ xi)
i
: (10)





i + (1   )~ ~ xi:
From (10) and Assumption R, holds that p  x

i < p  !i + s  [ri   f(x

i )], and




i )  ui(x
 i;x
i):
Note now that for  2]0;1[ close enough to one, x

i belongs to XM
i and therefore,
















Finally, choosing  suciently close to 1, the continuity of f implies that
p
   xi  p
  !i + s
  [ri   f( xi)];





In order to show a kind of First Welfare Theorem (FWT) in our model, we will consider
a particular denition of optimality since, as it is well known in the literature, in
presence of externalities there are simple counterexamples where this theorem fails.
The following denition is a particular extension of the Pareto optimum notion for
the case of an exchange economy with externalities.
Denition 5 We say that x = (x
i) 2 FR is a Nash-Pareto optimum for the economy
ER if there does not exist another feasible allocation (x0
i) 2 FR such that for each i 2 I,
ui(x)  ui(x
 i;x0
i) and for some i0 2 I, ui0(x) < ui0(x
 i0;x0
i0):
Theorem 2 First Welfare Theorem
Suppose that the economy ER is under the assumption of Lemma 1. If ((p;s);(x
i))
is an Nash-Walras equilibrium of ER, then (x
i) is a Nash-Pareto optimum for the
economy ER.
Proof. Suppose that (x
i) is not a Nash-Pareto optimum and let (x0
i) 2 FR be such
that for each i 2 I, ui(x
 i;x0
i)  ui(x) and for some i0 2 I, ui0(x
 i0;x0
i0) > ui0(x).
From this last condition, given that (x


















  !i + s
  [ri   f(x
0
i)]: (12)







































which is a contradiction with the feasibility of (x0
i), since all vectors participating in
the right side are greater or equal than 0` and 0k respectively. This is a contradiction
with the equilibrium denition. E.O.P
6 Conclusions
This paper deals with the problem of setting a price system for licences or consumption
rights in an economy in which there are caps on consumption, and in order to consume,
agents are required to have the corresponding licences for consumption. This fact leads
to the possibility of establishing a market of rights or licences.
Examples of this situation are the European Unions Emissions Trading System
established in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations under the Kyoto
Protocol (see Ellerman et al. [5]). Also, there are other cap-and-trade systems for
emissions that have been implemented in the U.S. In these kinds of systems the price of
allowances are set depending on the controlling cost of the negative eects (pollution).
Our model can be used not only on emission control systems, but also to deal with
any other licence-based models where allowances are required in advance. Such rights
are for instances, licences for aircraft landing at each destination, or for shing in a
region where the amount of captures is regulated. Is it also possible to consider such
model to control road congestion by distributing total transit rights for specic links
such that ows capacity ratios are limited on these links.
In our approach, agents evaluate their utility considering all the consequences in-
volved in their consumption plan and the consumption plans of the others consumers.
The allowances must be acquired at the same time as contracts for raw materials are
signed. Thus, prices of the allowances are linked to prices of commodities. Our model is
based on the existence of an exogenous function which evaluates the potential negative
eects derived from each contract. This mapping associates to every consumption plan
(contract) a theoretical amount of rights of each type and consequently, to measure
the actual negative eects of consumption is not required in our model. Our aim is to
analyze the immediate consequences of setting a cap with a trade system of allowances
in a simple model of general equilibrium.
We have shown that under very weak conditions on the fundamentals of the econ-
omy, equilibrium exists and, given the \status quo", the equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimum.
Our analysis point out that if the cap is eective for a raw material, the price of this
commodity becomes irrelevant at the equilibrium and is the price of the corresponding
licence that matters. Given that we deduce that the eectiveness of the cap only
depends on the total amount of allowances, the political welfare aspects derived from
15the distribution of allowances among the agents becomes the relevant problem for the
planner of the cap and trade system.
Finally, we would like to remark that in this paper we are not considering the
political welfare aspects derived from the distribution of the allowances among the
agents. We shall focus on this problem in a future study.
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